1971 by Srinath Raghavan

Author:Srinath Raghavan [Raghavan, Srinath]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Published: 2013-11-11T18:30:00+00:00

VII

While the bigger players in the Commonwealth went their own ways, the smaller countries sought to take the lead. On 27 June 1971, the secretary-general of the Commonwealth, Arnold Smith, received a message from Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike of Ceylon asking him urgently to consult all Commonwealth countries with a view toward finding a solution to the crisis. Smith had earlier attempted, without success, to offer the services of the Commonwealth secretariat. At the end of March, he had called on the Pakistani envoy in London, Salman Ali, and proffered the Commonwealth’s assistance in arriving at a political solution. The high commissioner undertook to transmit this to Islamabad, but unsurprisingly there was no response. Smith repeated his offer to Yahya’s own envoy, Arshad Husain, when he visited London in May, and again drew a blank. Smith would not give up, however. On 16 June, he wrote directly to Yahya, extending the Commonwealth’s good offices. During this period, Smith also met with Jayaprakash Narayan and Swaran Singh during their visits to England. The Indian foreign minister “made no commitments and blandly said that it was up to Islamabad to decide how it proceeded.”97

On receiving Prime Minister Bandaranaike’s message, Smith suggested that she invite to Colombo a small group of “carefully selected governments” to confer on the crisis. He specifically recommended that Pakistan and India should not be invited to this meeting. Smith thought it would be better for the Commonwealth group to travel separately to both countries as well as meet the Awami League leadership in India. Smith believed that the “root of the problem was the need to persuade the Pakistan government to take steps which would bring about a political solution tolerable to the Bengalis.” Sirima Bandaranaike liked the idea of chairing a small Commonwealth contact group, but she overreached by inviting India and Pakistan to the meeting.98

The idea of Commonwealth mediation found no favor with either Britain or Australia. Already weary of dealing with the Commonwealth, Heath took the position that “there is a long standing Commonwealth convention that we do not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.”99 Canberra held that “it would not be in Australia’s interests to get caught up in mediation efforts between India and Pakistan. Mediation efforts would inevitably fail, and our relations with both countries would suffer.”100

Indeed, both Pakistan and India took exception to the idea. Disappointed with the statements emanating from London and Canberra as well as Ottawa’s decision to withhold military supplies, Islamabad was already threatening to leave the Commonwealth. The “time had come to cut [the] link,” said Pakistan’s additional foreign secretary Mumtaz Alvie to the Ceylon high commissioner. Sultan Khan curtly added that Pakistan was not interested in Ceylon’s initiative under the Commonwealth umbrella—if Prime Minister Bandaranaike wished to proceed, she should do so on her own.101 India’s response was starkly negative. As Haksar told the Canadian envoy, “What is in it for Mrs. Gandhi? What is she to say to him in present circumstances after his Jun[e] 28 statement makes it perfectly plain his mind is closed?… To talk to him would be a waste of Mrs.

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